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THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW DIMENSIONS
OF THE UFFI PROBLEM: PART II*
David Coherrt

3. Public Law Dimensions
The decentralized and unstructured decision-making process
leading to the inclusion of UFFI in the federally financed home
insulation programme suggests that the question whether the
federal government is responsible in law for the injuries allegedly
suffered by Canadian homeowners and their families is not easily
answered. The liability of the federal government must first be
analyzed in terms of the various individual government employees
for whose activities the federal government or Crown corporations may be vicariously responsible, and in terms of an analysis
of the Crown corporations for whose activities the federal
government may be responsible. In addition, the question as to
governmental liability must, to a very large degree, depend upon
the nature of the activity (or failure to act) which is being
addressed. It is possible to identify several acts of the federal
government, acting through its employees, and of Crown
corporations, acting through their boards or employees, which
may be reviewed by the courts:
(1) the decision of Cabinet in enacting regulations delegating
financial and material acceptance authority over the home
insulation programmes to C.M.H.C. ;
(2) the decision of C.M.H.C. to issue "acceptance" numbers to
specific UFFI manufacturers in the summer of 1977, in the
absence of an application standard, and without an effective
policing or enforcement mechanism to ensure the quality of
the installed insulation;
(3) the decision of the Department of Supply and Services, acting
through the C.G.S.B. to establish a product standard for
For Part I of this paper see 8 C.B.L.J. 309 (1983-84).
Assistant Professor of Law,Faculty of Law,University of British Columbia.
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UFFI insulation, which apparently failed to consider any
potential hazards to health associated with use of the foam;
(4) the failure of C.M.H.C., the Department of Supply and
Services, and the Department of Energy, Mines and
Resources acting through the Office of Energy Conservation,
to warn potential users of the risks to health and safety
associated with use of the product;
(5) the negligent representation of the acceptable quality of the
product by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources
in its energy conservation information programme, and by
C.M.H.C. through its issuance of acceptance numbers to
particular manufacturers; and
(6) the failure of the National Research Council to engage in
adequate research and literature searches to ensure that its
advice to the C.G.S.B. reflected all available information
regarding the product.
The jurisdiction of the courts to impose liability on the federal
government is founded in federal legislation - the Crown
Liability
which permits the court to find the state vicariously liable for the torts committed by its servants or agents.232
The attention of the court must be focussed on individual rather
. ~ ~ ~ in any discussion of the
than bureaucratic b e h a ~ i o u r Thus
potential liability of the federal government, the point of judicial
inquiry will be the identification of a tort committed either by an
individual federal employee or by a Crown corporation for whose
acts the federal government is liable. The vicarious liability of the
federal government for the faults of its individual employees
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, as amended. The only amendment to the Act which is relevant to
this study is the enactment of the wiretap provisions of the Criminal Code, and the
related amendment of the Crown Liability Act which renders the state liable in
damages where a servant of the Crown intentionally interrupts a private communication in the course of his employment. See Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c.
50, s. 4; Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, s. 7.2(1).
U2 Ibid., ss. 3(l)(a), 4(2). See Sociedad Transoceanica Canopus S . A . , Owners of rhe
Vessel M.S. Procyon v. National Harbours Board, [I9681 2 E x . C.R. 330 (B.C.
Admiralty Dist.).
233 It should be noted, however, that the vicarious liability of the state can be imposed by
virtue of the collective acts or omissions of a number of servants whose behaviour
contributed, albeit in a small way, to the alleged negligent act. See Wilfred Nadeau Inc.
v. The Queen in right of Canada, [I9771 1 F.C. 541 (T.D.), at p. 545, affd (19801 1 F.C.
808 (C.A.).
231

Heinonline - - 8 Can. Bus. L.J. 411 1983-1984

41 2

Canadian Business Law Journal

pol. 8

reflects an underlying philosophical and institutional perspective
regarding the judicial imposition of liability on the state. This
approach does not attribute fault to the state as an abstract
concept, but to individuals - judicial control, if it is exercised at
all, is directed at particular government employees, not at the
. ~ non-liability of the state
public service or the state i t ~ e l fThe
reflects what I have chosen to refer to as a "pure-corrective
justice model" of judicial decision-making.235 The primary
element in this theory is the judicial view of the action as a
dispute - a "one-against-one" conflict - and thus requires the
individualization of responsibility as reflected in the vicarious
liability structure of state liability.
It is my impression that judicial review will take place only
rarely. First, one has to acknowledge the defendant bias introduced by the concept of vicarious liability. Second, the jurisdiction to impose liability on the state, as opposed to the
jurisdiction to impose liability on a civil servant in his individual
capacity, is quite
and obviously is enjoyed only with the
u4 Perhaps an intended benefit of the vicarious liability of the state is the creation of
judicial sympathy for the individual, often well-intentioned, public servant who must
be found personally liable to the plaintiff(s) before the state can be found vicariously
liable. See C. Harlow, "Fault Liability in French and English Public Law", 39 Mod. L.
Rev. 516 (1976), at p. 540; National Association of Attorneys-General, Sovereign
Immunity, The Liability of the Government and Its Officials, revised ed. (1976), at pp.
25,26. While some jurisdictions have expressly limited the scope of judicial review, the
courts themselves will often voluntarily establish limited executive immunity. See
Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 401 P.2d 440 (1965); Weiss v.
Fote, 167 N.E.2d 63 (1960).
u5The corrective justice model, as its name implies, focuses on the positions of the
litigants to restore, if possible, the relationship between the two. I. Englard, "The
System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory", 10 J. Leg.
Stud. 27 (1981); S. Jorgensen, "Liability and Fault", 49 Tul. L. Rev. 329 (1975); A.
Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation", 89 Haw. L.R. 1281 (1976).
u6The Crown Liability Act, supra, footnote 231, was enacted in 1953 (S.C. 1952-53, c.
30). One must keep in mind that until quite recently authority of the court to review
executive decision-making was extremely limited, and to a large extent could be
exercised only when the executive thought it appropriate. See Petition of Right Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. P-12, repealed by R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.), s. 64(1), proclaimed
in force August 1, 1972; Crown Procedure Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 89, repealed by
S.B.C. 1974, c. 24, s. 16(1), proclaimed in force August 1, 1974 (but see s. 16(2)) and
superseded by the Crown Proceedings Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 24; H. Street,
Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press, 1953), at
pp. 1-6; W.P. Kennedy, "Suits by and Against the Crown", 6 Can. Bar Rev. 329
(1928); D.P. Jamieson, "Proceedings by and Against the Crown in Canada", 26 Can.
Bar Rev. 373 (1948); P. Hogg, Liability of the Crown in Australia and New Zealand
(Melbourne, Law Book Co., 1971). at pp. 2-9.
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permission of the defendant. The courts are certainly aware of
the propensity of Legislatures to enact privative clauses to restrict
judicial review of administrative action in the traditional sense of
that term. In the case of judicial review of incompetence, the
openness of the judicial role cannot be disguised in jurisdictionallprocess terms, and thus the risk of legislative retaliation is even
more acute. The result, it seems, is a deliberate judicial reluctance to engage in review of anything but the most insignificant
bureaucratic acts. In addition, the courts may be cognizant that
even damage awards may have an instrumental effect on bureaucratic behaviour, and that this "primary direct effect" may be
quite powerful in the case of public
Accordingly, the
courts may be much more sensitive t o the potential instrumental
effect of their decisions in cases of bureaucratic incompetence
than would be the case in the development of rules of private
conduct.
The final reason for judicial reluctance to act concerns the
nature of the task in which the courts must engage when
reviewing bureaucratic incompetence. The decision of the
executive branch of government which the courts must decide
was so incompetent as to justify compensation to an injured party
will almost always involve the exercise of discretion. The
discretion may range from the establishment of the national
energy programme - the establishment of priorities, national
objectives, and massive economic and social programmes
intended to define and describe the role and function of the state
in a specific sector of society - to the decision of a building
inspector to issue a building permit, a decision directly involving
an individual private citizen. In both cases, and in all cases falling
between these extremes, the "discretionary decision" is simply a
statutorily authorized power of decision requiring a choice to be
made among alternative courses of action in accordance with the
exercise of judgmer-t by an individual.238The court's reluctance to
interfere with discretionary decisions rests on the traditional
model of judicial decision-making - that the court simply applies
237 See

P. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 3rd ed. (London, Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1980), at p. 62.
See P. Anisman, Discretion, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Administrative Law
Project (1975), p. 2; S . A . de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed.
(London, Stevens & Sons, 1969), p. 264; Ontario Royal Commission, Inquiry into Civil
Rights I (1968), p. 30; K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969), p. 4 .
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positive rules established in earlier cases, to a specific fact situation. The legal decision (according to this model) is the result of
The
an inexorable (and mechanical) process of logical analy~is.2~~
classic, albeit naive, view, especially in Canada and England, is
that the exercise of discretion is for the public service, the rule of
law for the
The result is judicial retreat when courts are
confronted with executive decisions which are clearly based on an
analysis of political, social, economic or cultural variables (or
rationalized on that basis). The prior executive or bureaucratic
activity cannot easily be distorted into a rule-based decision
which would permit judicial review under the guise of law. To
acknowledge judicial review of bureaucratic discretion might very
well be to acknowledge judicial exercise of discretion. For the
courts to review bureaucratic activity is not only to overstep institutional boundaries and risk governmental disapproval, but also
involves the courts in an activity which they have insisted is
inappropriate and in which they do not openly admit to
participating.241
At the same time, the courts are aware that the bureaucracy
should not be immune from legal responsibility for its behaviour
in every case where it injures a member of the public. The
bureaucracy does not, as a matter of dogma, act in the public
interest,242and if one accepts that premise then perhaps there are
some cases where review is appropriate. As well, the argument
can be made that the injury suffered by an individual was
incurred as a result of an activity which benefitted the state, and
certainly benefitted the public either in terms of an abstract
See P. Russell, "Judicial Power in Canada's Political Culture" in M.L. Friedland, ed.,
C o u m and Trials: A Multidisciplinary Approach (1975), at pp. 77-9; ~ E Hehner,
.
"Growth of Discretions - Decline of Accountability" in K. Kernaghan, ed., Public
Administration in Canada, 3rd ed. (1977), at p. 325.
240 See Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (1959). "The rule of law is contrasted
with ... government based on the exercises of persons in authority of wider arbitrary o r
discretionary powers". See also S. Wexler, "Discretion: The Unacknowledged Side of
Law", 25 U.T.L.J. 120 (1975), at pp. 121,122; M.R. Cohen, "Rule Versus Discretion"
in Law and the Social Order (1933), at p. 259.
z4' Associated with this concern is the converse. If the courts establish themselves as a
bureaucratic review agency, they may be perceived by the public as a participant in the
implementation of public policy as defined by the government in power. See Nonet,
Administrative Justice (1969), at p. 4.
z42That argument has in fact been made by public authorities. See C.J. Hamson,
"Escaping Borstel Boys and the Immunity of Office", 27 Camb. L.J. 273 (1969), at p.
276.

239
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social/economic calculus, or directly in terms of reduced
government contributions. Moreover, institutional limits which
judges place on themselves should be imposed with the
knowledge that their decision does not necessarily involve
second-guessing the bureaucracy, or controlling governmental
- it simply obliges the state to pay compensation to an
injured party. The argument for limited judicial review is also
supported by a reassessment of the impact of damage awards on
government decision-making. At one time it might have been
possible to argue that a judicial order to pay damages would have
a substantial impact on the allocation of financial resources by
government among competing claims for limited funds. Whatever
the merit of that argument in the past, the expansion of state
revenue-raising powers and activity suggests that the risk of
judicial control of resource allocation has been ameliorated.244
Finally, the courts, while not the sole institution available to
provide compensation and to ensure accountability, are independent, at least on a relative basis, from the state.Z45
The conclusion which one draws from this analysis and what is
apparent from the cases which I discuss later, is that judges will
review alleged bureaucratic incompetence only in cases of
and wrongfulZ4' individual bureaucratic activities
which take place in a direct relationship with private individuals.
The ultimate judicial concern appears to be that judicial review in
P.P. Craig, "Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory Power", 94 L.Q.R. 428 (1978),
at p. 446. This perspective reinforces the compensatory rather than injunctive characteristic of the corrective justice model of law making. The damage award obliges the
government to calculate the risks generated by its activity, and establish an insurance
scheme to provide compensation to losers.
244 See D. Engdahl, "Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs", 44
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1972), at pp. 59,60.
245 K.C. Davis, Adminbrrative Law (1972), p. 497.
246 A prerequisite to judicial review in all cases is the preliminary determination that the
act of the bureaucrat was not authorized. See text, infra, at footnotes 248 to 263.
247 Not only must the behaviour be unlawful, it must be associated with fault, either in
terms of subjective bad faith or of negligence. See Malar v. Bjornson, [I9781 5 W.W.R.
429 at p. 435, 6 C.C.L.T. 142 at p. 150 (B.C.S.C.), affd 114 D.L.R. (3d) 612, 23
B.C.L.R. 235 (C.A.); Inland Feeders Lrd. v. Virdi (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 685, [I9821
1 W.W.R. 551 (B.C.C.A.). The same analysis is applied in the case of statutory duties.
See Canadian Pacific Airlines Lrd. v. The Queen (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 511 at pp. 51516, [I9791 1 F.C. 39 at p. 45.
Similarly, the courts repeatedly stress that they will not impose liability simply for
"errors of judgment". See Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Lrd., [I9701 2 All E.R.
294, [I9701 A.C. 1004 (H.L.).
243
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the form of damage awards does not influence the institution of
government. That is, the damage award is designed to have only a
minimal instrumental effect on bureaucratic activity.
It is well established that if an employee or agent of the state
acts within his lawfully delegated area of authority, there is no
judicial review of the activity for the purposes of establishing civil
liability.248At this early stage in the development of the scope of
judicial review of administrative incompetence, the criteria which
the judges will use to determine the lawfulness of bureaucratic
activity have not been fully articulated, and one must keep in
mind that the decision of unlawfulness is simply a technique
which will permit the courts to legitimize their role as reviewers of
executive action. Some judges have indicated that an activity or
decision will be unlawful if the decision was so unreasonable that
no reasonable person could hold that the statutory object would
be furthered by the decision.249Others suggest that a decision will
be unlawful where no reasonable person could argue that it was
justified by the delegating instrument;250where the decision is so
unreasonable that there has been no exercise of the delegated
discretion;251and most commonly, where there is no evidence or
rational explanation upon which to base the discretionary
248 See Anm

v . London Borough of Merton, [I9771 2 All E.R. 492 at pp. 501,503,505-6,
[I9771 2 W.L.R. 1024 p. 1037 (H.L.); Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., supra,
footnote 247 at p. 333 All E.R., p. 1068 A.C.; Hogg, supra, footnote 236 at pp. 72-7,
81, 104; James v. Commonwealth (1939), 62 C.L.R. 339; Takaro Properties Ltd. v.
Rowling, [I9781 2 N.Z.L.R. 314 at p. 340; K.C. Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise
(St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1958), p. 487.
This analysis has been adopted in Canada. See Diversified Holdings Ltd. v. The
Queen in righr of British Columbia (1982), 133 D.L.R. (3d) 712 at pp. 720-3, 35
B.C.L.R. 349 at pp. 358-60 (S.C.), affd 143 D.L.R. (3d) 529,41 B.C.L.R. 29 (C.A.);
Barratt v. District of North Vancouver (1978), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 473, 6 B.C.L.R. 319
(C.A.), affd 114 D.L.R. (3d) 577, [I9801 2 S.C.R. 418; Berryland Canning Co. Ltd. v.
The Queen (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 568, [I9741 1 F.C. 91 (T.D.); Central Canada Potash
Co. Lrd. v. Government of Saskatchewan (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 609 at p. 642, [I9791 1
S.C.R. 42 at p. 90.
249 See Home Ofjice v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 247 at pp. 331-5 All E.R.,
pp. 1067-71 A.C., per Lord Diplock; Nielsen v. Ciry of Kamloops (1981), 129 D.L.R.
(3d)111,[1982]1 W.W.R.461(B.C.C.A.).
so See H. W.R. Wadz, Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977), p.
628; Harlow, supra, footnote 234 at p. 532.
3 1 See cases, supra, footnote 249.
s2 Malat v. Bjormon (1980) 114 D.L.R. (3d) 612 at p. 619, 23 B.C.L.R. 235 at p. 242
(C.A.); Craig, supra, footnote 243 at p. 429. Thus in Nielsen v. Ciry of Kamloops,
supra, footnote 249, Lambert J.A. held, at p. 119 D.L.R., p. 469 W.W.R., that "a
decision not to act at all, or a failure to decide to act, cannot be supported by any
reasonable policy choice."
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It is not clear if there is a distinction among these tests, or if it
matters.
The important point is that the judges feel it necessary for good
reason to rationalize their interference by stigmatizing the
bureaucratic behaviour as "unlawful". This emphasizes the
blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct and reinforces the
corrective justice philosophy which I believe fuels judicial activity
in this area. In addition, where the court adopts the "no rational
justification for the exercise of discretion" criterion of unlawfulness, the state as the defendant must offer, publicly, the rationale
or justification for its activity. While the scope of judicial review
is perhaps limited, the state justification must be made in public,
which encourages, or at least permits, political accountability.
A further explanation for the judicial requirement of unlawfulness is the view that by predicating judicial review on a determination of unlawfulness, the courts will not be risking executive
retaliation253 against judicial interference with bureaucratic
government. Where the court can say that a public servant has
disregarded the limits of authority delegated to him by a superior
decision-maker, the courts will simply reinforce the expected
bureaucratic sanction by imposing a complementary legal
sanction.254 The courts can thus identify their activity as an
adjunct to the internal disciplinary action which the bureaucrat
will face.
The judicial requirement of unlawfulness is also explained by
the nature of state liability under the Crown Liability Act. The
plaintiff must, under s. 3 of the Act, point to a tort committed by
an individual employee or agent who will be personally liable to
the plaintiff. The possible catastrophic impact of personal liability
in damages (which the bureaucrat may not be able to shift to his
employer) suggests that the court may be reluctant to impose
personal liability for activity which an official was lawfully
instructed to carry
Further, s. 3(6) of the Act provides that
253The courts must be aware of the power of the defendant to retaliate. See Harlow,
supra, footnote 234 at p. 540.
Z4See e . g . , Home Ofice v. Dorser Yacht Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 247, where Lord
Diplock made the point that the officers in control of the prisoners disregarded their
instructions concerning the preventive means which they ought to have taken to
prevent the escape of the prisoners.
255 See Fox-Hitchner v. Province of Alberta, Burr and Foster (1977). 6 A.R. 43, 3 C.P.C.
288 (S.C.T.D.);Wade, supra, footnote 250.
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A determination of unlawfulness is, however, not dispositive in
Under the Crown Liability Act the
establishing Crown liabiIit~.~6l
plaintiff must demonstrate that the civil servant committed a tort,
which in most cases will involve either a decision that the
employee acted in bad faith262or, alternatively, was negligent in
carrying out a statutory duty or in exercising a statutory
The issue of judicial review of bureaucratic incompetence in
the performance of mandatory statutory duties or in the exercise
of statutory discretion will, it seems, be considered in the context
of a negligence action. At one time it was thought that breach of a
statutory duty would develop as a conceptually distinct private
law action. Recent cases suggest however, that traditional negligence concepts will be applied both to activities rendered
pursuant to mandatory statutory duties and to discretionary
statutory directives. In the former case, which may arise under
~ action may be
the Department of Supply and Services A ~ t , 2 6the
framed as a "breach of statutory duty",265 while in the latter case
it will be framed in common law negligence terms.266 In both
cases, the court must determine whether a bureaucrat (or a group
of bureaucrats) in carrying out statutory responsibilities, owed a
legal duty of care to the person who alleges that he was injured as
a result of the negligent performance of those statutory responsibilities.
The decision to impose a private legal duty on bureaucratic
See Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Metropolitan Corp. of Greater Winnipeg (1970), 22
D.L.R. (3d) 470, [I9711 S.C.R. 957; Bowen v. City of Edmonton (1977), 80 D.L.R.
(3d) 501 at p. 514,119771 6 W.W.R. 344 at p. 360 (Alta. S.C.T.D.).
262 See J. McBride, "Damages as a Remedy for Unlawful Administrative Action", [I9791
Camb. L.J. 323; B. Gould, "Damages as a Remedy in Administrative Law", 5
N.Z.U.L.R. 105 (1972).
263 It is not surprising that the courts demand more than simple unlawfulness before they
will impose liability on individual civil servants. This accords with the corrective justice
paradigm which I believe is operative in this area of law. As well, it is quite possible
that the public law role of the judges would be limited to a substantial degree if they
were to d o otherwise. See Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee (New
Zealand), Damages in Administrative Law (1980), a t pp. 34-5.
R.S.C. 1970, c. S-18.
265 See Hogg, supra, footnote 236 at pp. 99-104.
266 In the case of an alleged breach of a statutory duty, the court will often ask whether the
statute establishes a private right of action for the breach of the statutory duty. See
Hogg, supra, footnote 236 at p. 100; de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative
Action, 4th ed. (London, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1980), p. 530; Curler v. Wandsworth
Stadium Ltd., [I9491 A.C. 398 (H.L.), at p. 407; Canadian Federation of Independent
Business v. The Queen (1974). 49 D.L.R. (3d) 718 at p. 720, [I9741 2 F.C. 443 at pp.
449-50 (T.D.).
261
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activity has been said to depend on the nature of the activity
under review. Where the bureaucratic decision takes place within
the operational sphere of government, the court will hold that the
bureaucrat owes the individual a private, legal duty of care.
Conversely, policy or planning decisions of bureaucrats are
beyond judicial review. This categorical distinction has been
adverted to with increasing frequency since the House of Lords'
decision in Anns v. London Borough of Mert0n.26~
The categorization of governmental functions into policy and
operational spheres, even if we could agree on the criteria to use
in determining into which camp one should put a particular
decision, is entirely artificial. The description of the foam
insulation approval process which took place in the context of a
financial incentive grant programme, which itself was an element
in a multi-sector conservation policy, which itself was an aspect of
a national energy programme designed to achieve energy selfsufficiency in Canada suggests that each bureaucratic decision is
both an operational and a policy or planning decision. Each
decision, in most cases, will be made in the context of implementing a superior policy decision; and will itself constitute a
superior policy decision which will be implemented by inferior
operational (policy) decisions. It is not that a decision has both
operational and policy aspects, and that as the former predominates the court is more likely to review it.268Rather, the decision
This bipartite test was first stated by the House of Lords in Anns v. London Borough of
Merton, [I9771 2 All E.R. 492, [I9771 2 W.L.R. 1024. It has been adopted almost
without criticism by Canadian courts. See Nielsen v. City of Kamloops (1981), 129
D.L.R. (3d) 111, [I9821 1 W.W.R. 461 (B.C.C.A.); Barratt v. District of Norrh
Vancouver (1978). 89 D.L.R. (3d) 473, 6 B.C.L.R. 319 (C.A.); Johnson v. Adamson
(1981), 128 D.L. R. (3d) 470 at p. 475,34 0.
R. (2d) 236 at p. 241 (C. A.).
Every case which I have been able to discover adopts this categorical framework of
analysis. Under this analysis the issue of judicial review is absolute. Where the court
decides that the decision is "operational", it will hold that the bureaucrat owed the
class of persons to whom the plaintiff belongs a private legal duty of care, and will then
go on to determine whether the activity was "negligent". Where the court decides that
the decision was a "policy" decision, it will hold that no legal duty of care arises, and
thus that the conduct is immune from judicial review. See M. Bridges, "Governmental
Liability, The Tort of Negligence and the House of Lords Decision in Anns v. Merton
London B.C.", 24 McGill L.J. 277 (1978). at p. 285; J.A. Smillie, "Negligence and
Economic Loss", 32 U.T.L.J. 231 (1982), at p. 265.
2-58 Cf. Anns v. London Borough of Merton, supra, footnote 267 at p. 500, per Lord
Wilberforce.

26'
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is both a planning and an operational decision, and the court must
decide whether it will review the policy/operational decision.269
The categorization demanded by Anns will certainly breed
apparently inconsistent decisions, and produce simplistic definitions of policy decisions contrasted with operational decisions.270
What we must keep in mind is that we do not have policy and
operational decisions in government. We have decisions, some of
which are appropriate for judicial review, and some of which are
not. What we need are the tools to assist us in making the distinction. For the time being we are working within a conceptual
framework which, at the very least, should require the courts to
formulate their reasons for deciding that a particular act is appropriate for review. I have identified several interdependent
variables which I consider to be relevant to this determination.
No doubt there are many others.
I have chosen to describe the first variable as "standards of
conduct". To a very large degree, the reticence of the courts to
review bureaucratic behaviour is due to their inability to identify
an independent, external, pre-existing objective standard against
which to assess the executive de~ision.~''Where the court is able
to identify a superior bureaucratic standard pursuant to which the
decision under review ought to have been exercised, it is able to
assert that the fault of the latter consists of a departure from a
standard. The court can thus avoid evaluating "fault" in terms of
269 What

the UFFI case study demonstrates is the development of administrative policy at
the "implementation" stage of governmental action. Superior policy instruments which
appear to give bureaucrats unlimited discretion, are applied through the development
of inferior policy to restrict the exercise of that discretion. See Molot, "The SelfCreated Rule of Policy and Other Ways of Exercising Administrative Discretion", 18
McGill L.J. 340 (1972); Robinson, "The Making of Administrative Policy: Another
Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform", 118
U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1970); K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969), at pp. 97-103; J.
Willis, Canadian Boards at Work (Toronto, MacMillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1941), at
p. 71; Re Becker and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1977), 15 A.L.R.
696 at p. 701 (reference to departmental policy).
270 See cases at footnote 267, supra. See also Toews v. MacKenzie (1980). 109 D.L.R. (3d)
473, 119801 4 W. W. R. 108 (B.C.C. A.); Canadian Federation of Independent Business
v. The Queen, supra, footnote 266 at p. 723 D.L.R., p. 450 F.C.; The Queen in right of
P. E.I. v. The Queen in right of Canada (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 465 at pp. 483-4, [I9761
2 F.C. 712 at pp. 733-4 (T.D.), appeal dismissed, cross appeal allowed 83 D.L.R. (3d)
492, 119781 1 F.C. 533 (C.A.); Berryland Canning Co. Ltd. v. The Queen (1974). 44
D.L. R. (3d) 568,119741 1 F.C. 91 (T.D.); Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. The Queen
(1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 511 at pp. 519-21, [I9791 1 F.C. 39 at pp. 50-3 (C.A.).
Craig, supra, footnote 243 at p. 434; R. Pepper, "The Negligent Exercise of Statutory
Power: A Comment on Kwong v. The Queen", 39 U.T.F.L.R. 77 (1981), at p. 93.
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the abstract propriety of the conduct according to the personal
view of the judge as t o the correctness of the decisi0n.~72The
existence of a standard is important for several reasons. First, it
reduces the risk that the legitimacy of judicial discretion will be
questioned. Second, the court need not spend inordinate
amounts of time and resources developing the standard against
which to assess the bureaucratic conduct. Finally, the court,
where it applies a superior bureaucratic standard, is in fact
reinforcing the position of the superior bureaucrat, by adding a
legal sanction to whatever internal disciplinary measures exist.
could state that the role of
Thus Lord Diplock in Dorset
the court was to deter the government employees from
completely disregarding the interests of the escaped prisoners;
and in
the standard against which the inspector's conduct
was assessed was to take reasonable care to observe that the
government's own bylaws were observed.275
The identification of an independent standard of conduct
developed within the bureaucracy may be facilitated where the
alleged negligence takes place in the context of "programmed
decisions". This second variable acknowledges that the bureaucratic process may be described as a series of discretionary
decisions with varying degrees of uniqueness.276 As decisions
become routine, and must be made more frequently, it is less
likely that discretion can be exercised, and the "correctness" of a
particular programmed decision can be evaluated through a
comparison with other decisions of the same class. The bureaucrat's own decision becomes the standard.277 In the foam
insulation case, one might examine the governmental standardsetting process, including evaluative techniques, variables under
inquiry, the identity of the participants and the independence of
the research data, which was applied in the case of the several
272 See Harlow, supra, footnote 234 at p. 517.
273 Home Ofice v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., [I9701 2

All E.R. 294 at pp. 331-5, [I9701 A.C.
1004 at pp. 1067-71.
274 Supra, footnote 267 at p. 501 All E.R., p. 1035 W.L.R.,per Lord Wilberforce.
275 Thus in the foam insulation case, the prospects of judicial review would be increased to
the extent that one can identify superior policy decisions within the Department of
Energy, Mines and Resources, the Department of Supply and Services, the National
Research Council o r the C.M.H.C. which were not observed by the bureaucracy.
276 See K. Kernaghan, Public Administration in Canada, 3rd ed. (1977), p. 314.
n7The courts are well aware of this "uniqueness" concept. See A.-G. Ont. v. Palmer
(1979), 108 D.L.R. (3d) 349 at p. 351,28 O.R. (2d) 35 at p. 37 (C.A.).
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insulation products for which standards were set. These
programmed decisions may provide an objective basis upon
which to determine the "reasonableness" of the state conduct in
the particular case of establishing a foam insulation standard.
The third variable which the courts have recognized as an
element in the establishment of a legal duty of care is the degree
of discretion exercised by the bureaucrat whose conduct is under
inquiry. Even where a superior standard of conduct can be
identified, it may be that the inferior bureaucratic conduct is
characterized by substantial discretionary elements which point
away from judicial review.278 While it is true that the mere
presence of discretion will not preclude review,279the court must
be aware of the political risks which it runs were it to identify
conflicting interests of the classes of persons likely to be affected
by the decision, place a value or weight on those interests, and
perhaps identify a general public interest in the pursuit of the
activity in question. The court, even in this case, has standards
which it can apply - the difficulty is that the criteria involve
elements of social wisdom, political practicability, and economic
expediency,280 whose application might expose the court to
political retaliation and social criticism. As well, the self-defined
role of the courts has been to deny the exercise of judicial
discretion and, as the bureaucratic decision is characterized by
increasing discretionary authority, it becomes difficult to disguise
what the court is doing.
The fourth variable which should be considered focuses on the
nature of the private interest affected by the bureaucratic activity.
It is possible that the long history of judicial review of nuisance
cases involving interference with use of land,2g1 and a similar
willingness to review police enforcement practices,282 reflects
27s See

Toews v. MacKenzie, supra, footnote 270.
279 See Nielsen v. City of Kamloops, supra, footnote 267; Johnson v. State of California,
447 P.2d 352 (1968). But see Craig, supra, footnote 243 at p. 444.
=Osee Blessing v. United States, 447 F . Supp. 1160 (1978). This factor explains the
concern of some commentators that the "impartiality of the courts would be impaired if
it were asked to make value judgments on matters of social and economic policy". See
The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Working Paper and Survey:
Review of Administrative Decisions, Part I - Appeals (1978), at para. 4.17.
281 See e.g., Managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill (1881), 6 App. Cas. 193
(H.L.); Harlow, supra, footnote 234 at pp. 527-33.
282 See Weiler, "The Control of Police Arrest Practices: Reflections of a Tort Lawyer" in
Linden, ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Law (1968); Christie v. Leachinsky, [I9471 A.C.
573 (H.L.); Koechlin v. Waugh and Hamilton (1957), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 447, [I9571
O.W.N. 245 (C.A.); Harlow,supra, footnote 234 at pp. 527-8.
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judicial values which demand a greater degree of bureaucratic
circumspection where land ownership or occupation, or
individual freedom, are at stake. This consideration may have
been influencing Linden J. in Johnston v. A.-G. Can. ,283 who
refused to follow an earlier decision284denying the existence of a
duty of care in similar circumstances. One explanation offered by
Linden J. was that in the former case the plaintiff suffered
personal injuries, while in the latter the alleged loss was purely
economic. It may be that the nature of the injuries in the foam
insulation case, where they can be identified as the loss of the
family home and serious risks of personal injury, will point
towards judicial review.
A fifth variable which may be relevant in deciding if judicial
review ought to take place looks to the unintentional nature of the
government activity. Where a bureaucrat makes a deliberate
choice to injure a particular class of individuals, or to expose that
class to the risk of injury, the question as to whether the losers
should be compensated has not been perceived as a question for
the judiciary. In such cases, the decision will most likely have
been authorized, and where the injury is deliberate, the combination of lawfulness and intentional infliction of injury suggests
that political review will be the appropriate mechanism for
redress. It is difficult to picture deliberate, lawful activity as
wrongful in the context of the corrective justice model of lawmaking. As well, judicial sanctions imposed on deliberate
governmental activity may result in retaliation, which may not
take place where judicial review is restricted to unintentional
conduct. It is always open to the bureaucracy to argue that it
decided to expose a large class of homeowners to the risk of
personal injury in order to expedite the establishment of a home
insulation programme, and that this decision was authorized
under the relevant statutory mandate.285
A sixth variable involving judicial review looks to the nature of
(1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d)459 at p. 468.34 O.R. (2d) 208 at pp. 215-16 (H.C.J.).
Canadian Pacifk Airlines, Ltd. v. The Queen, supra, footnote 270 at p. 520 D.L.R., p.
51 F.C.
285 Where deliberate injury is unlawful, the potential for judicial review on the grounds of
malice exists. See, supra, footnote 262. See also RoncareNi v. Duplessis (1959), 16
D.L.R. (2d) 689, [I9591 S.C.R. 121; Gersham v. Manitoba Vegetable Producers
Marketing Board(1976),69D.L.R. (3d) 114, [I9761 4 W.W.R. 406(Man. C.A.).
2.3
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the government activity which is alleged to have been negligent.
It seems that the courts will be much more willing to exercise a
supervisory jurisdiction where the state is engaged in an activity
in nature, as opposed to
which can be identified as "cornrner~ial'~
~~
activities which are characterized as " g ~ v e r n m e n t a l " . ~The
distinction, which admittedly is not an easy one, is based on a
number of factors. First, the court, in assessing a commercial
activity carried out by government will be able to turn to the
behaviour and practice of private enterprise as an independent,
objective standard against which to gauge the reasonableness of
~~~
where the state is
the government b e h a v i o ~ r .Secondly,
engaged in commercial activities in competition with private
enterprise, the court may be concerned that the state not be given
competitive advantages, and thus will subject the public enterprise to the same constraints as its private counterparts.288Where,
on the other hand, the state is engaged in providing a service
which would not, for a variety of reasons, be produced through
the market, the court may consider it inappropriate to impose
market constraints. In the latter case, the traditional test of negligence which looks to the cost of injury prevention in light of the
probability, nature and extent of the injury, gives rise to serious
inconsistencies. The public, non-commercial enterprise does not
necessarily operate subject to the pricing and budgetary
constraints imposed by the costs of labour, capital and other
inputs, and by market competition.289 Where the activity is
commercial in nature, however, it may be subject to constraints
analogous to those operating in private enterprises.
%See Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Winnipeg (1970), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 470, [I9711 S.C.R.
957 (potential liability of city in negligence when exercising business powers); Virdi and
Thompson-Nicola Regional District v. Inland Feeders Ltd. (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 685
at pp. 688-9, [I9821 1 W.W.R. 551 at p. 555 (B.C.C.A.). See also North and Wartime
HousingLtd. v. Madden, [I9441 4 D.L.R. 161, [I9441 Que. K.B. 366, appeal dismissed
[I9451 1 D.L.R. 753, [I9451 S.C.R. 169; Mersey Docks Trustees v . Gibbs (1866), L.R. 1
H.L.93.
287This is most obvious in the case of government road construction, in which the
techniques of road construction used in private industry are familiar to the courts. See
R. v. Core; Millette v. Kalogeropoulos (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 244, [I9761 1 S.C.R. 595.
See generally, East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kenr, [I9411 1 A.C. 74 (H.L.),
where the defendant's behaviour is compared with that of a private building contractor.
See also Boynton v . The Commissioners for the Ancholme Drainage and Navigation,
[I9211 2 K.B. 213 (C.A.).
*8 See British Columbia Power Corp. Ltd. v. A.-G. B.C. (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 25 at p.
29,38 W.W.R. 657 at pp. 661-2 (B.C.C.A.).
Z9 See British Railways Board v. Herrington, [I9721 A.C. 877 (H.L.), at p. 899.
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In addition, the state, where it is engaged in a commercial
activity, may be able to pass on the costs of the negligence
liability to the users of the government service or
This
loss allocation mechanism may not be as easy to implement in the
case of non-commercial, governmental activities,291where access
to the service cannot be controlled to the same degree. In the case
of commercial activities the loss will be borne, to some degree, by
the users of the service or good. The beneficiaries of the
government programme and policy decisions will, in the
commercial context, be compensating the losers. This transfer
from winners to losers may take place in "governmental" activities as well, but the redistribution is more likely to take place
through pricing decisions in the provision of commercial services.
In governmental activities the bureaucratic and political embarrassment accompanied by public, forced compensation may point
away from a decision to allocate the costs of regulation to the
beneficiaries of government decisions.292Finally, the willingness
of the court to review commercial governmental activities may be
justified on the basis of protecting expectations of individuals who
may find it difficult to distinguish between private and public
enterprises when the latter are carrying on commercial
activities.293
The activity of the government in the foam insulation case runs
from the creation of an energy conservation programme, to
standard setting of product quality, to the encouragement of
product purchases through information dissemination. The
standard-setting process has been classified as a policy decision in
several American cases,294even though political scientists might
describe this activity as administrative rather than policy-making
in nature.295 Cases of government information transfer to
290This cost may in fact be spread through an insurance arrangement which, at least in the
case of relatively small governmental units, may be available in the case of commercial
activities. It might not be available in respect of "governmental" functions.
291 See Hogg, supra, footnote 236 at pp. 89-90.
292 See J. Quinn and M. Trebilcock, Compensation, Transition Costs and Regulatory
Change, Working Paper No. 18, Economic Council of Canada (1981), at p. 23.
293 See Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp. (1978), 90 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at p. 495, [I9791
1 S.C.R. 275 at p. 283.
294 See Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, 610 F.2d 558 (1979). Cf.Grifin v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1059 (1974). This governmental immunity has not been the case in all
jurisdictions. See J.G. Fleming, "Drug Injury Compensation Plans", 30 Am. J . of
Comp. L. 297 (1982), at p. 318.
295 See Public Government for Private People, The Report of the Commission of Freedom
of Information and Individual Privacy, Vol. 2 (1980), at pp. 192-4.
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encourage or facilitate private transactions have, however, been
the subject of judicial review on several occasions.296The explanation for the willingness of the court to review the government's
role as an information broker is that to require the government to
disseminate accurate information is a relatively non-intrusive
judicial role. In many cases the transaction costs of the information transfer will be relatively insignificant, especially where, as
in the foam insulation case, the state has decided to establish an
information transfer system in the pursuit of its policy objectives.
As well, the courts are quite familiar with the regulation of
information transfer in the private sector. Thus, while the
provision of information by the state in the case of insulation may
not have been a "pure" commercial activity, the nature of the
enterprise was such that the courts may be able to invoke private
standards which they can apply to the governmental behaviour.
A court may, however, hesitate to impose liability on the state
where the issue is not the duty to transfer information which the
state possesses, but to investigate certain matters and acquire
information which must then be transferred. In the latter case,
the costs of information acquisition may suggest to the court that
a private duty of care should not be established.297The issue is a
relative one, and in two recent cases the Federal Court has
suggested that the information-gathering activities of Treasury
Board officials298 and officials of the Food and Drug
D i r e ~ t o r a t will
e ~ ~be~ subject to judicial review.300
296

See Hendricks v. The Queen (1970), 9 D.L. R. (3d) 454 at p. 465, [I9701 S.C. R. 237 at
pp. 250-1. See also cases, infra, at footnote 308.

297 The

cases support this analysis. Judges are averse to the imposition of legal duties to
investigate, or to disclose information which the employee of the state "ought to have
known". See Toews v. MacKenzie (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 473 at p. 480, [I9801 4
W.W.R..108 at p. 115 (B.C.C.A.); Barratt v . District of North Vancouver (1980), 114
D.L.R. (3d) 577 at p. 584, [I9801 2 S.C.R. 418 at pp. 427-8; affg 89 D.L.R. (3d) 473 at
pp. 484-5, 6 B.C.L.R. 319 at pp. 332-3 (C.A.); Grand Restaurants of Canada Ltd. v.
City of Toronto (1981), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 349 at pp. 361-2, 32 O.R. (2d) 757 at p. 770
(decision to inspect building is discretionary and not subject to review, while decision
not to disclose results of inspection had it been made, will give rise to liability);
Windsor Building Supplies Ltd. v. Art Harrison Ltd., Yanke & Son Builders Ltd.,
Third Parties (1980), 14 C.C.L.T. 129 at p. 160 (B.C.S.C.) (investigation of possible
bylaw violations outside scope of judicial review).

298 See

Wilfred Nadeau Inc. v. The Queen in right of Canada, [I9771 1 F.C. 541 (T.D.),
affd [I9801 1 F.C. 808 (C.A.).

2%

Berryland Canning Co. Ltd. v. The Queen (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 568 at p. 583,119741
1 F.C. 91 at pp. 107-8 (T.D.). The Alberta Court of Appeal, however, has suggested
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A seventh variable which may influence a decision to impose
civil liability on the state relates to the status or identity of the
government actor.301 At the ultimate level of governmental
decision-making, the court will be asked t o assess the negligence
of legislative acts - a responsibility which they deny
absolutely.302 In most cases, however, the determination of
bureaucratic status will require an assessment of the bureaucratic
infra-structure in which the decision was made, in an effort to
determine the responsibility and authority of this bureaucrat and
his relationship with other political actors. The requirement that
the court investigate the actual bureaucratic decision-making
process and the actual nature and extent of scrutiny of the
decision by specific bureaucratic and political actors303 is
important for a number of reasons. As the behaviour of more
senior bureaucrats is scrutinized, it becomes increasingly likely
that similar bureaucratic activity is not subject to judicial review. See Kwong v. The
Queen in right ofAlberta (1978), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 214 at p. 231, [I9791 2 W.W.R. 1 at p.
19 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.), affd 105 D.L.R. (3d) 576n, [I9791 2 S.C.R. 1010n. In that
case, a decision of Gas Protection Branch officials not to warn the public of risks posed
by converted gas furnaces was held to be a policy decision. The Court of Appeal
appeared to direct its attention to an alleged duty of care owed by the bureaucrats to
the public, consisting of an obligation to advise the provincial Cabinet to enact
regulations. (See L.W. Klar, "Developments in Tort Law: The 1979-80 Term", 2
S.Ct.L.Rev. 325 (1981), at p. 363.) The decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed in
a manner which suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada was analyzing the duty
issue on the same lines.
3w One should keep in mind in evaluating the likelihood of judicial review in the foam
insulation case that the civil liability of product endorsers is a relatively novel development in products liability litigation. See Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher
Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109 (1967); Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680
(1969); C.F. Pechlin, "Liability of Certifiers of Products for Personal Injuries to the
User or Consumer", 56 Cor. L. Rev. 501 (1970); Note, "Tort Liability of Independent
Testing Agencies", 22 Rut. L. Rev. 299 (1968).
301 See P.S. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 3rd ed. (London, Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1980), pp. 61-3; Bridges, supra, footnote 267 at p. 281; Canadian Pacific
Airlines Ltd. v. The Queen (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 511 at p. 521, [I9791 1 F.C. 39 at p.
53 (C.A.); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U . S . 515 (1953); Hendry v. United States, 418
F.2d 774 (1969); D. Schwartz and S.B. Jacoby, Litigation with the Federal Government
(1970), p. 204.
302 See Kwong v. The Queen in right o f Alberta, supra, footnote 299 at pp. 221-3 D.L.R.,
pp. 7-9 W.W. R.; Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Metropolitan Corp. of Greater Winnipeg
(1970), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 470, 119721 3 W.W.R. 433 (S.C.C.); J.R.S. Holdings Ltd. v.
District of Maple Ridge (1981), 122 D.L.R. (3d) 398 at p. 408, [I9811 4 W.W.R. 632 at
p. 644 (B.C.S.C.) (no duty of care owed in the passage of legislation).
303 See Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) 2 A.L.D. 634
(1979), at pp. 644-5; see M.D. Kirby, "Administrative Review Beyond the Frontier
Marked 'Policy-Lawyers Keep Out' ",12 Fed. L. Rev. 121 (1981), at 132-3.
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that political and broad discretionary decision-making will be
involved. Further, where the court attempts to review the activities of more senior bureaucrats it may risk political retaliation,
and thus it is not at all surprising to discover that the majority of
cases involving judicial review of governmental activity have
involved municipal governments - the one tier of government
which cannot retaliate directly by withdrawing its operations from
judicial review. Finally, by demanding that the government
identify the bureaucrat or group of bureaucrats who participated
in the decision under review, the court will encourage political
accountability where appropriate. The government can identify a
lower level bureaucrat where it wants to minimize direct political
responsibility, but when it does so, it risks legal liability. At the
same time, where the state points to bureaucratic seniority to
avoid legal responsibility, it increases the likelihood of political
responsibility.
The question as to the status and identity of the bureaucrat who
made the decision under review is complemented by judicial
concern that courts not interfere officiously in broadly based
social disputes which may be resolved through non-legal
processes. The availability of limited judicial resources is only
one aspect of this attitude. The courts are also aware of the risk of
conflicting judiciaVpolitica1 solutions to the dispute. The availability of alternative sources of accountability - whether through
political action304 or through the doctrines of ministerial305and
bureaucratic306responsibility - has been noted by the courts as a
relevant factor in deciding whether to create a private right of
action.
Possibly the most significant factor which the courts recognize
The Queen in right of Canada v. The Queen in right of Prince Edward Island (1977), 83
D.L.R. (3d) 492 at p. 520, 119781 1 F.C. 533 at p. 567 (C.A.), Appendix A (the
question is whether political action is the sole sanction for a failure to provide adequate
service to the public); Barratt v. Districr of North Vancouver (1978), 89 D.L.R. (3d)
473,6B.C.L.R.319(C.A.)
305 Canadian Federation of Independent Business v. The Queen (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 718
at p. 721, [1974]2F.C. 443at p. 450(T.D.).
xxi See Stopforth v. Coyer (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 373,4 C.C.L.T. 265 (Ont. H.C.J.), revd
97 D.L.R. (3d) 369, 8 C.C.L.T. 172 (Ont. C.A.). As Kernaghan points out, the view
that bureaucrats are not subject to parliamentary review is being transformed as the
policy and political decision-making roles of senior bureaucrats become impossible to
ignore: see K. Kernaghan, Freedom of Information and Ministerial Responsibility,
Research Publication 2, Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual
Privacy (1978), at pp. 17-29.
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in determining whether a private legal duty of care should be
imposed o n the bureaucracy is the requirement of an individualized wrong. The nature of corrective justice is that it is
designed t o redress a perceived wrong which one party has
committed against another. This suggests that the alleged wrong
must be individualized in nature -there must be an "individualization of responsibility" for the alleged negligence founded on a
direct relation between the state employee and an individual
member of the
In fact, in almost all cases in which the
state has been found liable for the acts of its employees the
alleged negligent behaviour occurred in this "one-on-one"
bilateral relationship.308
This requirement of individualization of harm can be justified
on a number of grounds. First, the courts ameliorate the interjurisdictional tension between the judiciary and executive when
they restrict themselves to compensating individual wrongs.
Second, the requirement of an individual nexus reduces the
potential impact of the decision on the exercise of broadly
described bureaucratic discretion. Third, by requiring a n individualistic aspect, the courts avoid the substantial administrative
costs of determining the identity of numerous claimants, and the
nature and extent of their alleged losses.309 As well, the existing
procedural rules and administrative structure of the court system
are singularly ill-suited to the resolution of group
307 See

Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Metropolitan Corp. of Greater Winnipeg, supra,
footnote 302 at pp. 477-8 D.L.R., p. 441 W.W.R.; Kwong v. The Queen in right of
Alberta, supra, footnote 299 at p. 229 D.L.R., p. 16 W.W.R.; Cleveland-Cliffs Steamships Co. and Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. The Queen (1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 673 at pp.
679-80, [I9571 S.C.R. 810 at p. 814.
308See Grossman v. The King, [I9521 2 D.L.R. 241, [I9521 1 S.C.R. 571; O'Rourke v.
Schacht (1974), 55 D.L. R. (3d) 96, [I9761 1 S.C.R. 53; Ostash v. Sonnenberg (l968), 67
D.L.R. (2d) 311, 63 W.W.R. 257; Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban District Council,
[I9721 1 Q.B. 373 (C.A.); Ordog v. District of Mission (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 718,31
B.C.L.R. 371 (S.C.); Grand Restaurants of Canada Ltd. v. City of Toronto, supra,
footnote 297; Danard v. The Queen, [I9711 F.C. 417 (T.D.); Sociedad Transoceanica
Canopus S.A. v. National Harbours Board, [I9681 2 Ex. C.R. 330; Lyon v. Village of
Shelburne; Triton Engineering Services Ltd., Third Parries (1982), 130 D.L.R. (3d) 307
(Ont. Co. Ct.); Nielsen v. City of Kamloops (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 111 at p. 118,
[I9821 1 W.W .R. 461 at pp. 468-9 (B.C.C.A.).
309 See Quinn and Trebilcock, supra, footnote 292 at pp. 32-7.
3lOThis argument works both ways. If the claim against the government should be
permitted, the establishment of government liability will avoid the enormous litigation
costs inherent in the alternative private, fault-based product liability cases. The administrative costs posed by a governmental liability suit must be compared to the adminis-
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Fourth, the courts recognize the potential instrumental effect of
damage awards which, where they involve increasing numbers of
plaintiffs, may have a significant prospective, instrumental
In addition, the courts are
influence on bureaucratic behavio~r.~lI
aware that as the number of losers increases, the prospect of
political or parliamentary accountability increases. Finally, where
a large number of potential losers exists, the ability of the court to
entertain a range of interests in its decision-making process may
and the
be limited. The "losers" are not a homogeneous
technical and quite artificial rules of evidence and procedure may
distort the adequate representation of these disparate interests.313
The tenth variable is probably the judicial favourite. The
decision of the state to engage in certain activities will often
involve an allocation of public resources, and the decision will be
made in the context of competing claims for government largesse
and programmes, both from within and from without the
bureaucracy. If the alleged negligent decision involved the
allocation of resources among competing claims for social
resources,314or if the impact of the decision will influence future
resource allocation decisions,315the decision is less likely to be
trative costs incurred in the alternative. 1 would suspect that the former are far greater
in magnitude. See G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970), pp. 28, 250-9; T. Ison,
Accident Compensation (1980), p. 122; U.S. Department of Commerce, Inter-Agency
Task Force on Products Liability, Final Report, Vol. 5 (1976); Fleming, supra,
footnote 294 at p. 316.
311 See text, supra, at footnote 237.
312 The potential losers include: homeowner-purchasers of urea formaldehyde insulation;
sub-buyers of homes; persons who relied upon information provided by government
(and those who did not); purchasers who purchased insulation prior to C.M.H.C.
acceptance; and those who bought after August 1977; insulation installation companies
and their shareholders and employees; insulation component manufacturing
companies and their shareholders and employees; a variety of insurance companies;
and members of the public who directly or indirectly will be asked to bear the financial
responsibility of a government liability suit. It is obvious that the interests of these
groups may not be co-extensive.
313 See Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., [I9701 2 All E.R. 294 at pp. 331-2, [I9701
A.C. 1004 at p. 1067.
314 See Cleveland-Cliffs Steamships Co. and Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. The Queen,
supra, footnote 307 at pp. 679-80 D.L.R., p. 814 S.C.R. (authority involves the action
of Parliament in voting money); Barratt v. District of North Vancouver, supra, footnote
297; Hugh v. Vancouver (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 527 at p. 538, [I9811 5 W.W.R. 250at
p. 264 (B.C.S.C.).
315 Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. The Queen, supra, footnote 301 at p. 520 D.L.R., p.
51 F.C. This attitude is also reflected in suggestions that the state should be liable only
for "additional damage" caused by its negligent acts. See East Suffolk Rivers
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reviewed.316 Once the resource allocation decision has taken
place, then the inferior decision as to how the activity should be
carried out may be reviewed.317
I have no difficulty accepting the general proposition that
resource allocation is a function which almost by definition will
require that particular interests be sacrificed. It is also difficult to
see how the reasonableness of a particular resource allocation
decision could be objectively assessed by a court.318At the same
time, the court should appreciate that resource allocation is a
question of degree; and that the state can obtain insurance to
spread the costs of its activities.319
The courts have also turned to the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction as a relevant variable in determining whether to
impose a private duty of care on bureaucratic actors,320although
it is unclear whether the distinction is still doctrinally correct after
the decision of the House of Lords in Anns v. Merton London
Borough Council.321 At best it may have been a categorical
relative of the policy/operational distinction.322The distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance is a difficult one to draw at
best, and adds little to the analysis of the propriety of judicial
. ~ ~ ~the less, judicial deference to
review of state b e h a ~ i o u rNone
Catchment Board v. Kent, [I9411 1 A.C. 74 (H.L.), at p. 83; Hogg, supra, footnote 236
at pp. 85-91; Seguin v. Town of Hawkesbury, [I9551 5 D.L.R. 809, [I9551 O.R. 956
(C.A.).
S16The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Malat v. Bjornson, [I9781 5
W.W.R. 429 at p. 437,6 C.C.L.T. 142 at p. 152, in which a decision not to implement
an earlier decision to raise a highway barrier to 30 inches was reviewed, can be
explained on the basis that, as the trial judge found, the implementation decision could
have taken place "with no great expense or inconvenience".
317 Sheppard v. Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of the Borough of Glossop, [I9211 3 K.B.
132 (C.A.); Anns v. London Borough of Merton, [I9771 2 All E.R. 492 at p. 502,
[I9771 2 W.L.R. 1024 at p. 1036 (H.L.); Bridges, supra, footnote 267 at p. 288; Craig,
supra, footnote 243 at pp. 432-3.
See text, supra, at footnotes 271-7.
319 G.F. Kugler, Report of the Attorney-General's Task Force on Sovereign Immunity
(1972), at pp. 118-32, 147-8; Ministry of Housing and Local Government v. Sharp,
[I9701 2 Q.B. 223 (C.A.),at p. 269.
320 See McCrea v. City of White Rock (1974), 56 D.L.R. (3d) 525, [I9751 2 W.W. R. 593
(B.C.C.A.).
321 Supra, footnote 317. See Nielsen v. Ciry of Kamloops, supra, footnote 308. But see
Windsor Building Supplies Ltd. v. Art Harrison Ltd., Yanke & Son Builders Ltd.,
Third Parties (1980), 14 C.C.L.T. 129 (B.C.S.C.), at pp. 160-4; Kwong v. The Queen in
righrofAlberta (1978), 96D.L.R. (3d) 214, [I9791 2 W.W.R. 1 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.),
affd 105 D.L.R. (3d) 576n, [I9791 6 W. W.R. 573n (S.C.C.).
322 See Bridges, supra, footnote 267 at pp. 299-300; Neabel v. Town of Ingersoll(1967), 63
D.L.R. (2d)484, f196712O.R. 343 (H.C.J.).
323 In some cases the policy/operational and nonfeasance/misfeasance concepts are used as
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bureaucratic "nonfeasance" may be understood as a reflection of
several concerns. First, where a bureaucrat has acted, it may be
possible to use his own intended behaviour as an objective
standard against which to assess the reasonableness of his actual
behaviour. Second, where an alleged loss is incurred as a result of
governmental inactivity, the injury may be a foregone opportunity which may be viewed as a less substantial injury than an
actual incurred loss.324Finally, a concern with "pure" inaction
will often result in an inquiry as to whether the defendant's
conduct created or increased the risk of
This risk
creation concept brings us to the final variable which I have
identified in the judicial decision to impose a legal duty of care on
a state employee -the concept of reliance.
The courts appear to react to two categories of reliance. The
first is direct reliance, common in the "individualized wrong"
discussed earlier,326where a member of the public relies upon acts
or representations of a particular bureaucrat.327The second is
what may be called institutional reliance - the creation of an
environment by the state in which members of the public assume
that the state will be taking adequate precautions to ensure that
their interests will be safeguarded. Thus in cases of pure omission
the court may be willing to impose liability where the state has
established an institutional framework upon which the public
relies and where an individual refrains from adopting alternate
measures to reduce the risk of injury, or from insu;ingagainst the
ri~k.3~~
interchangeable concepts. See Kwong v. The Queen in right of Alberta, supra, footnote
321; J . Irvine, annotation entitled "Toews v. MacKenzie", 12 C.C.L.T. 263 (1980), at
p. 267.
324 See E. Weinrib, "The Case for a Duty to Rescue", 90 Yale L.J. 247 (1980), at pp. 249,
251.
325 Weinrib, ibid., at pp. 254-7. See Grossman v. The King, supra, footnote 308; O'Rourke
v. Schacht, supra, footnote 308; Hendricks v. The Queen (1970), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 454,
[I9701S.C.R. 237.
326 See text, supra, at footnote 307.
327 See cases at footnote 308; Town of the Pas v. Porky Packers Ltd. (1976), 65 D.L.R.
(3d) 1, [I9771 1 S.C.R. 51; Windsor Motors Ltd. v. District of Powell River (1969). 4
D.L.R. (3d) 155,68 W.W.R. 173 (B.C.C.A.). The same factor has been recognized in
the United States. See Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140 (1977), at p. 1148, cert.
denied 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
328See Anns v. London Borough of Merton, supra, footnote 317 at p. 500 All E.R., p.
1034 W.L.R.; Craig, supra, footnote 243 at p. 451; Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban
District Council, [I9721 2 W.L.R. 299 at p. 308, (19721 1 Q.B. 373 at p. 392 (C.A.);
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The reliance issue is, I think, a central concept in the decision
to impose a legal duty on the bureaucrat. It reflects the overriding
corrective justice philosophy which operates in this area, in that it
demands a bilateral relationship. The bureaucrat or bureaucracy
assumes responsibility for a certain activity which creates a reciprocal sense of trust and dependence.329More generally, we may
be able to see a more general interest in compensating disappointed individuals whose expectations were created by a governmental, institutional arrangement, and who relied on that
arrangement to protect their interests.330
4.

Conclusion

So far there is no solution to the urea formaldehyde problem.
The nature of the urea formaldehyde foam insulation production
process points to obvious gaps in existing product liability legislation, and reveals the as yet rudimentary conceptual framework
which the common law has developed to deal with complex
products liability claims. As well, the foam insulation problem is
not simply a legal phenomenon.
So far the efforts of public-interest lawyers have been primarily
directed to the design of a federal compensation programme. The
legislation establishing the programme, the Urea Formaldehyde
Insulation
provides for an initial funding of the
programme at $55,000,000.332 In addition, the federal
government has established a National Advisory Council on
UFFI, consisting of representatives of homeowners' associations
as well as individual homeowners, whose apparent function is to
represent the interest of unorganized homeowners in negotiations
Bridges, supra, footnote 267 at p. 282; Weinrib, supra, footnote 324 at pp. 254-7; J.A.
Smillie, "Negligence and Economic Loss", 32 U.T.L.J. 231 (1982), at p. 268; A.
Linden, Canadian Negligence Law (Toronto, Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd.,
1972), at p. 82.
However, the point has been implicitly rejected by Le Dain J. in Canadian Pacific
Airlines Ltd. v. The Queen (1978), 87 D . L . R . (3d) 51 1, [I9791 1 F.C. 39 (C. A.), where
he suggested that general reliance on a government-controlled public service or facility,
even if it is a monopoly service, is not in and of itself sufficient to establish a legal duty
to the public to provide it.
329 Smillie, supra, footnote 328 at p. 268.
330 Quinn and Trebilcock, supra, footnote 292 at p. 61.
331 Bill C-lOg, 1st Sess., 32nd Legisl., 29-30-31 Eliz. 11, 1980-81-82. The Bill received
Royal Assent on August 4,1982, was proclaimed in force October 25, 1982, and is nqw
S.C. 1980-81-82,C. 119.
332 Ibid., s. 8(1).
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concerning the substance of the compensation programme. Legal
representation has been retained to assist the Council. The
Standing Committee on Health, Welfare and Social Affairs
conducted an inquiry into urea formaldehyde foam insulation,
and tabled its Report to Parliament in December, 1982.333Thus
the resolution of the compensatory objectives of the potential
losers in the energy conservation programme is being worked out
in the political arena.
It is too early to predict the outcome of the political negotiations. The discussions involve a number of issues including the
aggregate amount of compensation to be paid, the identification
of the classes of persons eligible to receive compensation,
controls on consumer and industry abuse of the compensation
programme, and in particular whether the compensation
payments should be mandatory or discretionary. Negotiations in
the political arena are, however, distorted by the apparent
absence of leverage available to the homeowners' associations.
The benefits which the associations can offer to the state in return
for increased government largesse or for concessions relating to
the second order decision as to who should receive compensation
are limited. They are limited, first, to political support of the
programme, and second, to the homeowners' associations' assurances that the federal government's home insulation programme
- the cornerstone of Canada's conservation policy -will not be
jeopardized by public disclosure of the uninsured and unknown
potential risks associated with insulation materials and procedures currently in use in the residential sector.
These tentative advances in the political sector have not,
however, been complemented by legal victories. The difficulties
confronting individuals contemplating legal action include
substantial organizational costs, both in terms of financial
resources and time, and the existing legal, technical and scientific
uncertainties regarding the outcome of possible litigation against
the federal government, Crown corporations and commercial
enterprises. These logistical difficulties and the unavailability, in
333 See

Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Health,
Welfare and Social Affairs, Respecting Inquiry into Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, Issue No. 39, 3-8-82, at 39-3. The mandate of the Committee includes consideration of the process used to approve the material for use in Canadian homes. Ibid. See
Report on Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, Standing Committee on Health,
Welfare and Social Affairs (December, 1982).
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most jurisdictions, of an effective class action procedure, have
combined to restrict legal action to those jurisdictions in which
the state has seen fit to subsidize the lawsuit.334
The class action is a mechanism which would permit collective
legal action to be organized without the direct infusion of public
resources. It is my impression, however, that most lawyers
involved either directly or indirectly in the UFFI case, have
avoided existing rudimentary class action mechanisms for a
number of very good reasons. First, recent experience with class
actions suggests that the defendants will almost certainly counter
with a barrage of pre-trial motions in an attempt to have the
proceedings dismissed for procedural irregularities.335 In light of
the existing uncertainty as to the appropriate conceptual basis for
class actions, that potential response cannot be disregarded.
Further, the current procedural rules do not permit a preliminary
application to be brought to "certify" the proceeding as appropriate for a class action, nor do the current rules contemplate
review of counsel adequacy. The prospects of a class action are
further reduced by the enormous financial risks which lawyers or
their clients must face if either were to finance ultimately unsuccessful legal battles on preliminary procedural grounds.336 The
viability of a class action of national scope or perhaps of interprovincial co-operation has also been adversely affected by the
enactment of products liability legislation in Quebec, New
Brunswick and Saskatchewan which depart to a substantial
degree from the common law, and which differ in very significant
respects from one another as well. There is thus a limited
community of interest among consumers from various provinces.
Moreover, the current representative action, even if it were
allowed to operate in the most enlightened fashion possible, does
not contemplate individual recovery of idiosyncratic damage
claims subsequent to an initial determination of liability.
334 Discussions

with members of the Advisory Council indicate that the provinces of
Quebec and New Brunswick are assisting homeowner associations in this manner.
335 Naken v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. (1979). 92 D.L.R. (3d) 100,21 0 . R . (2d) 780
(C.A.), revd 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385,32 C.P.C. 138 (S.C.C.), is now infamous. See also,
Cobbold v. Time Canada Ltd. (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 611,28 O.R. (2d) 326 (H.C.J.);
York Condominium Corp. No. 148 v. Singular Investments Ltd. (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d)
61, 16 O.R. (2d) 31 (H.C.J.); Seafarers International Union of Canada v. Lawrence
(1979). 97 D.L.R. (3d) 324, 24 O.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.); Stephemon v. Air Canada
(1979), 103 D.L.R. (3d) 148,26 O.R. (2d) 369 (H.C.J.). All of these cases gave riseto
pre-trial applications to dismiss the action on procedural grounds.
3% See Cobbold v. Time Canada Ltd., supra, footnote 335.
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Even if recovery on this basis were possible the utility of the
class action is open to question where, as in the UFFI case, the
class of potential beneficiaries may consist of conflicting interest
groups. The current rules do not contemplate either notice or
opting-out mechanisms, nor are there methods in place to resolve
intra-class conflict. Finally, the class action in Federal Court is
subject to substantial free-rider problems where the potential
class members are able to predict that the defendant may, as a
matter of political necessity, compensate all homeowners if one
suit is successful.
The result of the archaic class action procedures has been the
creation of a corporate class action vehicle in Ontario.337This
arrangement contemplates the incorporation of a non-profit
corporation authorized, by each member, to retain a lawyer on
behalf of that member. The member also delegates to the board
of directors authority to make all litigation decisions on his
behalf, except for an agreement to settle the action. The lawyer,
acting for each member, will then commence legal proceedings
against the identical defendant(s) in each case, alleging the
identical wrong, and claiming liquidated damages on behalf of
each client. A major risk in this action, as in the class action, is
the degree of centralization of decision-making. The existing
corporate structure contemplates a four-man board of directors,
with the president having the deciding vote. The retainer
provides that the lawyer will be instructed by one individual
appointed by the board. The risks of intra-class conflicts of
interest arise in this case to the same extent as they arise 'in the
current, unsophisticated class action procedure, and again no
effective mechanism for resolving the conflicts appears to exist.
The political, legal, and social implications of the urea formaldehyde foam insulation problem have created a product liability
phenomenon which transcends the boundaries of a single societal
institution. A satisfactory resolution of the problem, if there is
one, may be possible only through the creation of a decisionmaking body, with authority to award compensation, which
avoids the institutional limitations inherent in the current judicial
system and can perhaps also overcome the inadequacies of the
existing procedural and substantive legal rules.
337 See, infra, this

issue, Comment by Andrew Roman.
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Comment on David Cohen's Paper: The Public and
Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem
Michael J. Trebilcock*

Liability for Economic Loss
The urea formaldehyde disaster raises a number of important
and intricate issues of public policy. These relate to the civil
liability of private suppliers of defective consumer products, the
compensatory obligations of government towards losers from its
policy-making and regulatory activities, and issues of the appropriate structure and processes of regulatory agencies charged with
public standard setting for products that may present health
hazards but where considerable technical or scientific uncertainty
initially surrounds the existence and extent of the hazards.
Professor Cohen's paper very ably and comprehensively
canvasses many of these issues.
1 wish to comment on those aspects of Professor Cohen's paper
that focus on the civil liability of direct and indirect suppliers of a
defective product for what he calls abstract economic loss essentially the substantial decline in market value of the homes of
purchasers of UFFI as a result of now generalized perceptions of
the risks entailed in living in such homes. The prevailing doctrinal
impediments to recovery especially against indirect suppliers
(manufacturers) are not to be gainsaid. The question I would like
to address briefly is, what would an optimal liability regime look
like? In examining this question, I will focus primarily on the
consumer-manufacturer relationship. Installers seem to be too
insubstantial a target to warrant practical consideration and, in
any event, seem to have controlled few of the key product safety
inputs. Removal costs facing the 80,000-odd homeowners who
purchased UFFI may run anywhere between 1 billion and 1.5
billion dollars (which may, of course, in many cases, render even
manufacturer liability moot).
This problem aside, economic analysis would tend to evaluate
product liability regimes against two distinct objectives - a
deterrent objective and an insurance (compensation) objective not clearly enough identified and differentiated in Cohen's paper.
With respect to deterrence, there is now wide consensus in the
' Director, Law and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
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law and economics literature that where significant consumer
misperception (underestimation) of risk is present, the first best
liability regime is strict liability, with a contributory negligence
defence if cost-justified consumer avoidance precautions are
possible (not, it seems, the case in the UFFI case).' What strict
liability achieves from a deterrence perspective is two things.
First, at least in theory, it forces manufacturers to adopt an
efficient level of care by balancing product defect costs to the
consumer against the costs of possible avoidance precautions to
the manufacturer and minimizing the sum of these two sets of
costs. Each manufacturer must make his own calculus, unlike a
negligence regime where courts must undertake the balancing
exercise, often in the face of complex and perhaps biased information about a manufacturer's avoidance possibilities (e.g.,
product modification) and associated costs. Second, strict
liability, by forcing adjustments in product prices to reflect
expected accident costs, even where these costs are unavoidable,
leads to an efficient level of output in the industry by causing
consumers to act, in response to relative prices, as if they were
fully informed. A negligence regime, on the other hand, given
consumer underestimation of residual risks, will lead to too high a
level of output being demanded in the industry in question, even
if the appropriate standard of care is correctly determined in
individual cases.
From an insurance perspective, if one assumes that most
consumers are risk averse, especially with respect to significant
risks to health or significant risks of substantial economic losses,
then the issue becomes whether manufacturers are the least-cost
providers of insurance (through a strict liability regime). In the
UFFI case, certainly as between manufacturer and consumer, it
seems highly likely that manufacturers were better placed than
consumers to appraise the risks, i.e., the probabilities of product
breakdown and consequences associated therewith and were
better placed than consumers to pool the risks either by taking
1 See e.g.,

A . Michael Spence, "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer
Liability", 44 Rev. Econ. Stud. 561 (1977); Steven Shavell, "Strict Liability Versus
Negligence", 9 J. Legal Studies 1 (1980); Dennis Epple and Arthur Raviv, "Product
Safety: Liability Rules, Market Structure and Imperfect Information", 68 Am. Ewn.
Rev. 80 (1978); A . Mitchell Polinsky, "Strict Liability Versus Negligence in a Market
Setting", 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 367 (1980); Richard Crasswell, "Products Liability and The
Duty to Disclose", J. Legal Studies (forthcoming).
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out product liability insurance or diversifying the risks across
various chemical or other product lines.
I conclude that an optimal liability regime for manufacturers in
the UFFI situation is strict liability. However, this conclusion
does not resolve the question of what costs strict liability should
confront manufacturers with.
Cohen is concerned that to allow all homeowners who had
UFFI installed to recover the depreciation they have suffered in
the value of their houses (assuming enforced disclosure of the
presence of UFFI) ignores the fact that the product is not
defective (a health hazard) in all cases and that not all consumers
may react adversely to it, even when it is (i.e., reactions may be
allergic in nature). I am not convinced by his concerns.
From a deterrent perspective, the objective of the choice of
liability regimes is to ensure that all suppliers (and indirectly all
consumers) are confronted with the full social costs associated
with use of a product. This promotes efficient resource allocation.
In the light of this objective, the analysis might usefully proceed
in two stages. First, contemplate a scenario where all units of the
product are defective and where all homeowners react or will,
over time, react adversely to it. Consider also that efficiency
considerations require that there should be a duty on
homeowners to mitigate the anticipated adverse health hazards
by taking appropriate avoidance precautions where the former
are more costly than the latter. These precautions presumably
involve removing the UFFI, installing new insulation, and
suffering disruption costs in the process. In this case, I would
assume that the market depreciation in the value of homes that
have not been repaired will roughly approximate these costs.
Thus either the repair costs (fully calculated) or the depreciation
costs should be reasonable measures of damage and properly
reflect the additional social costs (the real resource costs)
associated with the purchase of the defective product.
Consider next the scenario in the UFFI case posited by Cohen
where the market writes down all houses containing UFFI
without discriminating between defective and non-defective units
of the product or between allergic and non-allergic consumers.
One possibility is that the market is accurately discounting these
probabilities. The other is that it may not be - perhaps we have
moved from an initial underestimation by consumers of the risk
to a subsequent generalized overestimation in the market of these
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risks (and the social costs attendant thereon). However, how this
is known or can be discovered is not clear to me, given that no
one seems to know even now what the precise probabilities are.
Cohen seems to indicate a preference for confronting manufacturers only with the "true" or realized social costs of the product
defect, presumably homeowners with demonstrated adverse
health reactions who are compelled to remove the product. On
this view, consumers with adverse reactions and unsafe products
would be required to sort themselves, over time, from the larger
pool of homeowners.
I would argue, to the contrary, that market perceptions of the
risks (and attendant social costs) may be the most efficient
measure we have of these costs. Differentiating safe units of the
product from unsafe units and "safe" consumers from "unsafe"
consumers is likely to involve even greater social costs on the part
of whoever undertakes the task, whether consumers, suppliers,
the courts or regulatory agencies - if not, someone would
probably have done it, but no one has or seems about to. Highly
individualized court determinations of liability and measures of
damage, given difficult problems of causation and quantification
of health costs, would seem to involve higher administrative costs
than generalized liability of manufacturers to all homeowners in
the amount of the market depreciation of their homes.
Moreover, Cohen's proposal, in an environment of legal uncertainty as to applicable liability rules, may significantly impair the
liquidity of housing markets. For example, a homeowner who
wants or needs to move and whose house has been written down
$20,000 by the market but who has not yet become sick, will
either have to absorb this loss or avoid moving until he gets sick
(which may be inconsistent with cost-conserving rationales underlying conventional mitigation principles). A sub-buyer who
subsequently gets sick will have been compensated ex ante by the
reduction in the house price. Thus, no one may be able to recover
for the loss. It is true that if liability on the part of manufacturers
to both first and subsequent generations of homeowners who get
sick is clear, this problem may not arise, as one would assume
that sub-buyers (now guaranteed full compensation if they get
sick) would no longer have any reason to discount house prices.
Assuming away the possibility of market overestimation of the
risks, the aggregate damages under my proposal should be the
same as under Cohen's proposal, but with, it would seem, a
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significant saving in transaction costs. This, of course, underscores the artificiality of distinctions drawn in present tort law in
some contexts between liability for personal injury and consequential economic losses and liability for so-called abstract
economic loss.2 The latter may often be simply a cheaper way of
calculating the former. The only difference in the effects of the
alternative measures of damage may lie in the distributive
impacts on individual homeowners. If the market, in writing
down the value of houses with UFFI, is discounting significantly
probabilities of defects and adverse reactions thereto, all
homeowners will get their expected costs as damages whereas
under Cohen's proposals some homeowners will get their actual
costs (larger individual amounts in those cases). Risk averse
consumers may prefer not to assume the risk of facing this
difference between expected and actual costs. However, it is not
clear that in the UFFI case the market valuations of houses
containing UFFI are yielding significantly different measures of
expected and actual costs.
I conclude, therefore, that on deterrence grounds an optimal
liability regime for manufacturers of UFFI is strict liability to all
homeowners who have installed the insulation, with damages
measured either in terms of actual or anticipated repair costs or
market depreciation in the value of their homes. A second-best
regime, in deterrence terms, is a negligence regime which
includes liability for economic losses.
I believe that this general conclusion is reinforced by the
insurance perspective. The losses at issue are substantial,
uncommon, and unanticipated by most consumers. They are of a
magnitude and a type that standard homeowners' insurance
policies are addressed to (although not in this case apparently
included, presumably because unperceived). The prevalence of
homeowners' insurance for risks of this general magnitude and
kind suggest that if homeowners who had purchased UFFI had
accurately perceived the type of risks involved, they would have
wanted to be insured against them.
This, to my mind, leaves unresolved at the doctrinal level only
the problem of retroactivity. It might be argued that for the
courts to impose a strict liability regime, with liability for
See the observations of Laskin C.J. in Rivtow Marine Lid. v. Washington Iron Works
(1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530 at pp. 548 er seq., [I9741 S.C.R. 1189 at pp. 1216 et seq.
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economic loss, on manufacturers in a mass damage situation, as
in the UFFI case, would involve serious elements of non-marginal
retroactivity which would deny manufacturers the opportunity for
precautionary pricing and insurance adjustments that are central
to the arguments for strict liability. There is some force to this
argument. However, even under the present negligence regime, I
would argue that expected costs (market depreciation) should be
awarded to all homeowners as the cheapest way of estimating
actual personal injury and consequential property losses (for
which manufacturers are already liable). Thus, the present negligence regime should lead in the direction of the outcomes
proposed in this Comment.
One critical difference will remain between the two regimes:
under negligence, the courts will have to determine whether the
manufacturers took due care in designing and manufacturing
their product; under strict liability this is unnecessary. Until we
have such a regime in Canada, consumers and courts will be
forced to struggle with complex technological issues largely
beyond their competence. This is the ultimate civil liability
problem, in my view, facing the homeowners in the UFFI case. In
the further absence of sensible class action rules, the costs of
satisfying the evidentiary requirements cannot easily be borne
c~llectively.~
The final difficulty is a practical one. D o the manufacturers
have the resources to sustain the liability payments that may be
entailed? If they do not, homeowners face an equally intractable
set of difficulties in claiming against the government, either on
account of negligence in the regulatory process or on broader
grounds of public policy that might dictate that in some circumstances governments should compensate losers from state action,
. ~ of this may be to
whether or not negligence is i n ~ o l v e d All
suggest that the long-term lesson from the UFFI case is that much
more effective regulatory processes are required with respect to
many different forms of product-related or occupationally-related
health hazards so that UFFI-type cases arise less frequently in the
future. Designing such processes is itself a formidable task, given
--

3

See Donald N. Dewees, J. Robert, S. Prichard, Michael J. Trebilcock, "An Economic
Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules for Class Actions", 10 J. Legal Studies 155 (1981).
See e.g., John Quinn and Michael J. Trebilcock, "Compensation, Transition Costs and
Regulatory Change", 32 U.T. L.J. 117 (1982).
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the environment of scientific uncertainty and technological
complexity in which the regulatory process here typically must
per ate.^

Comment on David Cohen's Paper: The Public and
Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem
Andrew J. Roman *
Introduction
The strongest message I get from Professor Cohen's paper is
that the law in this area borders on chaos. The reasoning is
circular, and the considerations taken into account so large in
number and mutually contradictory as to preclude the discovery
of any rational underlying principle. In short: a golden opportunity for the advocate.
The UFFI problem, when fed into this confusing matrix,
provides an excellent lesson for the student of jurisprudence.
There must be half a dozen or more principles under which the
action could succeed, and probably an equal number under which
it could fail. There is more than enough "law" to justify any
conclusion. Hence, to me, the most important and interesting
legal lessons to be learned are not in the substantive law (that is,
in how to frame the cause of action) but in procedure and organization.

The FRESH Solution
Through a referral from Professor Cohen, I was approached by
a group of UFFI householders to explore the possibility of a class
action. After a moment's reflection, it was obvious that a class
action would be tactically inappropriate. None of the plaintiffs
nor their lawyer would probably live long enough to survive the
inevitable appeals of the motions to strike. In Canada there has
yet to be a major class action to succeed at trial. Given the
present climate of judicial hostility towards class actions and the

* See e.g., Carolyn J. Tuohy and Michael J. Trebilcock, Policy Options in the Regulation

of Asbestos-Related Hazards, Study Series, Ontario Royal Commission on Asbestos
(January, 1982).
General Counsel, The Public Interest Research Centre, Toronto. These comments were
delivered at the 12th Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law on October
23,1982, and, except as otherwise indicated, they only speak to events as of this date.
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rather heterogeneous nature of the UFFI class, I could see little
chance of success even under the Quebec law or the reform
proposed by the Ontario Law Reform Commission.
However, even if a class action were permitted and could be
undertaken expeditiously, it would create other problems. What
individual class representative would have, and would risk, the
amount of cash necessary (which I estimate at a minimum of
$30,000) to obtain the expert evidence required to prove the
necessary facts? What lawyer would risk perhaps an equal
amount of his own money for a chance at a most uncertain costs
award (even if contingent fees of the type recommended by the
Ontario Law Reform Commission were allowed)? To put it
simply, the UFFI litigation problem is not the law, but money.
Clearly, only a group of UFFI victims, pooling their resources,
can collect enough money to make the risk economically worthwhile. Given damages probably in the range of $35,000 - $60,000
per house, it is worth risking something to obtain redress;
however, it cannot be worth risking as much or more than the
potential recovery. O n the other hand, once a group of
individuals decides to pool resources to make the legal action
possible, why bring a class action to help all the "free riders" who
contribute nothing? As a practical matter, no programme of
fundraising for the action can succeed if one may obtain all of the
benefits without any of the burdens. For all of these reasons, the
only practical solution appeared to me to be a group action.'
To provide a collection device and conduit for the money, a
corporation called Foam Removal for Environmentally Safe
Housing Inc. (FRESH) was created. It is now recruiting actively
across Canada. Membership is obtained by submitting an application which includes a detailed questionnaire describing the
precise nature of the damages to the house, and attaching
estimates from qualified contractors for the removal of the foam
and the restoration of the building or, if that is impossible, for the
costs of its demolition and the purchase of another comparable
home. This application form is required to be filled out carefully
and to be sworn before a lawyer, notary, or commissioner.* An
The group may have to be subdivided for purposes of litigation into two or more groups,
depending on the common and different features of their claims.
Thus the court will have before it not merely paper allegations but actual sworn evidence
of damages. This can also reduce or eliminate the need for discoveries for many of the
plaintiffs and streamline the process of proving damages.
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initial contribution of $300 is also required. Further contributions
may also be required, but all of the revenues collected will be
held in trust and used only for the action.
To ensure that I am not swamped with dozens of phone calls
and letters from prospective members, as counsel to FRESH I
will be taking my instructions initially from one person. Once the
action is under way, that will change. The officers of FRESH will
be required to report regularly to the membership, and to convey
to the members, at my request, such information about the action
or offers to settle as may be relevant. This is to protect the
members from the danger of the defendant "buying off' the
leadership of FRESH with special offers in return for instructing
me to settle at a rate that is unfair to the other members. Also,
settlement will be on a basis of percentage of all claims, rather
than a fixed dollar amount per house. This avoids the creation of
conflicts of interest between members of the group with widely
differing damage claims.
The foregoing is only a short description of FRESH, although I
will be happy to expand on it if there is time during discussion. I
would be the first to agree, however, that FRESH is not for every
UFFI householder. We cannot provide a Rolls Royce level of
client service at a Lada price. Undoubtedly, if an individual
plaintiff can afford the costs of lawyers and expert witnesses on
his own, he would get much more attentive and individualized
service from his own lawyer. Similarly, there may still be a few
people naive enough to believe that a suit is unnecessary as there
may be a successful political solution to their problem if they wait
long enough. (All that this requires is half a dozen federal
government departments and agencies to announce publicly that
they were negligent, and to make voluntary compensation
payments for a total of approximately ll/z billion dollars to all of
the victims. This veritable orgy of political humility will be
achieved, it is hoped, by the seductive negotiating skills of the
federal government's National Advisory Council on UFFI.)
Professor Cohen describes the apparent function of the
Advisory Council as being "to represent the interests of
unorganized homeowners in negotiations concerning the
From what I hear,
substance of the compensation pr~gramme".~
the government's treatment of the Advisory Council has become
3

Supra, p. 435.
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something of a joke. Its members have no organizational
cohesiveness and nothing in common other than the fact that they
have formaldehyde in their homes. They have very little communication outside of official meetings, when they are flown to
Ottawa by their negotiating "adversaries" and brought into a
room where they are confronted by an organized team of skilled
and experienced bureaucrats. The legal skills which have been
retained to assist the Council are those of the government, and
not made available independently to the homeowner^.^ So far, if
one looks at what the Council has accomplished, the meeting
agendas suggest that apart from some minor administrative
improvements in a statute which offers a maximum of $5,000
compensation (and then only after all of the cost of removal has
been paid by the owner), the homeowners have nothing to show
for all their effort over almost a year. Rather, the government has
been successful in diverting, and perhaps even co-opting such
precarious indigenous leadership as the UFFI problem in its early
stages was able to create. If the members of these UFFI groups
realized that their membership dues had accomplished so little,
while so much time has been allowed to pass, they would no
doubt be concerned. I agree with Professor Cohen that the
apparent absence of leverage available to the homeowners'
associations in the political forum makes it clear that the legal
route is the only route to meaningful redress for what is
undoubtedly the largest and most serious single consumer
problem of the decade.
It is no longer particularly enlightening to describe the UFFI
problem, as Professor Cohen does, as a "political problem".
Whose political problem is it? The government has already put its
final offer on the table through the Urea Formaldehyde
Insulation Act and its Regulations. After a year of so-called
negotiations, not an extra dollar has been offered. Professor
Cohen suggests that the only satisfactory solution may be a
decision-making body with authority to award compensation, but
he neglects to tell us who would create such a body. Obviously, it
could only be the government, through legislation. But why
should the government do this? Its urea formaldehyde problem
has been solved. The next step is up to the homeowners.
While litigation is admittedly a slow and uncertain route to
However, I understand that as a result of Professor Cohen's efforts the services of a pro
bono public0 lawyer were made available to the Committee.
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compensation, it is at least preferable to passive acceptance of the
certainty that there will be no more voluntary compensation
forthcoming from the government.
The homeowners' UFFI problem can best be solved, in my
view, through a group action in the Federal Court of Canada
against the Federal Crown and several Crown agencies.

Conclusion
It seems to me that the UFFI challenge is primarily one of
procedure or organization, and of funding; it is not primarily legal
in the substantive sense. This is not to say that there will not be
difficult and complex substantive legal questions to resolve.
However, the techniques for resolving them are well established.
We must research and analyse all of the existing and emerging
legal doctrines, the statutes and the case law -compulsively. We
must use all our advocacy skills to distinguish the cases which
seem to run against us, while supporting those which favour our
argument. And, of course, we must retain and work collaboratively with the best expert witnesses we can find. None of this,
however, is truly new.
O n the other hand, the initiation and development of a group
action is not well known. I could not find any law books
explaining how to set up the membership in a group action, or
how to prepare my own retainer so as t o be fair to all of the
divergent interests in the group.
Let me conclude with a substantive point. In an age when big
government has in some areas supplanted the principle of caveat
emptor with a statutorily created government warning system
under the Hazardous Products Act,5 and has held itself out as the
expert in product safety, it is understandable that the public will
rely on these representations. This is particularly true when the
government publicizes the fact that it will provide grants to install
insulation which meets government-set standards, including
UFFI. Unfortunately, even programmes designed with the best
of intentions to help the consumer can, if carried out wrongly,
damage consumers on an unprecedented scale.

5

R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3,
as amended.
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